Jacopo Carmassi is Principal Financial Stability Expert at the European Central Bank. All views expressed are exclusively those of the author and do not implicate in any way the European Central Bank nor any other entity to which the author is affiliated.
In the last few years, the discussions on a new set-up of the European football system have largely focused on the Super League. However, a debate on the representation of Clubs in Europe has also been ongoing and also deserves the same attention: such debate involves two different associations – the ECA and the UEC.The ECA is the European Club Association, the association with the mission of preserving and promoting the interests of European football Clubs. The UEC is the Union of European Clubs, a new association also aiming to represent European football Clubs. The nature, tasks and objectives of ECA and UEC might therefore seem identical – but, is this really the case? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to analyse in detail the characteristics of both associations.
Before going deep into the analysis, two preliminary caveats are necessary. First, the goal of this article is not to take a position, but rather to describe the issues in a factual manner – with the hope that this factual approach may help the reader to form an own opinion. Second, the analysis in this article is based on current rules and frameworks, which however are evolving and might change, possibly also substantially, in the coming months. In this regard, it should be flagged that the ECA is currently working on an internal reform process which could significantly alter its current functioning.
The ECA, headquartered in Switzerland in Nyon, was founded in 2008 by 16 Clubs. The sixteen founding members are: Manchester United and Chelsea (England), Real Madrid and Barcelona (Spain), Juventus and AC Milan (Italy), Olympique Lyonnais (France), Bayern München (Germany), Porto (Portugal), Ajax (Netherlands), Rangers (Scotland), Anderlecht (Belgium), Olympiacos (Greece), Kobenhavn (Denmark), GNK Dinamo (Croatia) and Birkirkara (Malta). Members of ECA, which became 137 already in the 2008/2009 season, have increased to reach 600 in April 2024, with Clubs from all the 55 national associations which are members of UEFA. The current Chair of ECA is Nasser Al-Khelaifi, President of Paris Saint-Germain. The ECA, which is to date the sole association of European Clubs formally recognised by UEFA and FIFA, gathers a large share of first division Clubs of UEFA national associations, but also Clubs from second divisions, although to a lesser extent.
The UEC was publicly launched in April 2023, with an event held in Brussels (where the UEC has its legal seat). The statutes and organisational rules of the UEC are not public yet (but they will be soon) and the building-up of its membership is still in progress, but the information which is already publicly available makes it possible to perform a first analysis. The UEC has currently over 130 members from 25 countries. The list of members includes Osasuna (Spain), Union Saint-Gilloise (Belgium), RFS (Latvia), Lokomotiva Zagreb (Croatia), Bohemian FC (Ireland) and Maccabi Netanya (Israel). Representatives from these six Clubs have been members of the interim Executive Board established in June 2023 with the goal of guiding the UEC until its first General Assembly. The main target of the UEC are the so called “non-élite” Clubs, meaning the Clubs of middle and low first divisions but also Clubs of second divisions (but it is possible that the UEC may decide to expand the perimeter of its membership to also include Clubs from lower divisions, subject to certain conditions). In its first General Assembly, that will be held on April 24, a President, a (new) Executive Board, a Secretary General and a CEO will be appointed. The UEC expects that the structure of the Executive Board will be a reflection of the diversity it aims to protect – both geographically and in terms of economic and sporting development.
The founders and managers of the UEC decided to embark in this project because, in their opinion, “non-élite” Clubs would not be adequately represented and protected by the ECA. Their view is that the ECA would favour “élite Clubs”, without offering adequate representation to the other Clubs (a view shared by the President of the Spanish LaLiga, Javier Tebas, who is a supporter of the UEC). To better understand this position of the UEC – regardless of whether one may agree or not – it is necessary to analyse in detail the criteria that, as of today, regulate the participation of Clubs to the ECA. However, it should always be kept in mind that these rules are expected to change in the coming months and that the framework illustrated in this article might change soon (the degree and intensity of such change will clearly depend on the details of the reform).
The three types of ECA membership
On the basis of current rules, a Club may be part of ECA in three different forms: as ordinary member (as regulated by ECA statutes), as associated member (as regulated by ECA statues and ECA organizational regulations) or as member of the ECA network (not included in ECA statutes, but mentioned in the ECA organizational regulations).
According to the current ECA statutes (article 4), a men’s football Club can be an ordinary member of ECA on the basis of the following conditions:
- only Clubs from top men’s divisions of the UEFA member associations may be eligible to obtain ordinary membership;
- each member association is assigned a given number of Clubs eligible for ordinary membership on the basis of its position in the ranking in the UEFA men’s association Club coefficient (for this ranking, the results of all Clubs of a national association in the UEFA competitions are taken into account). For example, the member associations in the first three positions of this ranking may have 5 Clubs as ordinary members, while the national associations from the 29th position may have one Club as ordinary member. For each member association, the available spots are then allocated to the Clubs with the best positions in the UEFA men’s individual Club coefficient ranking;
- additional Clubs may also be entitled to ordinary membership, if i) they have regularly participated to the group stage of any UEFA competition in recent seasons (i.e. at least three times in the previous ECA cycle, which has a duration of 4 seasons), or ii) they won at least five times a UEFA competition;
- conceptually similar criteria, with a combination of ranking and sporting merit, are also applied for women’s Clubs.
A Club which does not meet the requirements to be eligible for ordinary membership might be eligible for associated membership, on the basis of requirements defined in the ECA “Membership Policy” (section D of the ECA organizational regulations). To be eligible to become an associated member, a Club must be: i) a founding member of ECA (if the Club is not already an ordinary member), and ii) a Club of a top men’s UEFA member association that has obtained, during an ECA cycle, at least 2 points based on a specific table (on page 28 of ECA organizational regulations). For example, a Club may be eligible for associated membership if it won a UEFA competition at any time in the past (2 points), or it qualifies for the group stage of a UEFA Club competitions (2 points), but also if it was ordinary or associated member in the previous ECA cycle (1 point) and has achieved qualification to a UEFA Club competition (any stage, including the qualifying rounds) in the current season (1 point). All men’s and women’s UEFA Club competitions are relevant for these criteria.
Finally, since 2022 the ECA has introduced the possibility, for Clubs which are not ordinary not associated members (or that may have lost such membership following a relegation from a top division), to become member of the ECA network. Being part of the ECA network allows these Clubs to benefit from a series of services from ECA in the areas of advisory, research and knowledge sharing, in multiple fields (e.g. legal, commercial, finance, women football and youth football) and with a variety of products (e.g. courses, publications, newsletters, roadshows, workshops and helpdesk). On the basis of the criteria illustrated, in practice Clubs of second divisions may become member of the ECA network, but not ordinary nor associated members.
How many Clubs are part of ECA, for the different membership forms?
The number of ECA members has increased very significantly, especially in the last year and particularly with regard to network members (Figure 1). The total number of members has increased from 250 in 2022 to the current 600 – a 140% increase. Ordinary members have increased from slightly more than 100 (a value which had been fairly stable between 2008 and 2022) to 137 as of April 2024. Associated members have grown more markedly, but also more gradually, from 34 in 2008/2009 to 185 as of April 2024, with a significant growth over the last few years. Finally, network members have increased extremely rapidly, particularly in recent months, reaching the number of 278 in a very short time horizon. These 278 members represent around 80% of the increase in the total number of members from 250 in 2022 to 600 in April 2024.
The country with the highest number of ECA members as of mid-April 2024 is Italy (28), followed by France (24), Turkey (22), Bulgaria (19), Germany (18) and England (17) (here table with list of ECA members; here table with number of ECA members by country and type of membership). This ranking is largely influenced by the number of network members, in particular for Italy (17), Bulgaria (15), Turkey (15) and France (13). When considering only the number of ordinary members, England, Germany and Italy share the first position, with 7 Clubs each. With regard to associated members, the first place in the ranking is taken by France, England, North Macedonia, Kosovo and Malta, each with 6 Clubs. All UEFA national associations have at least one ordinary member; 23 national associations have only one ordinary member. The national associations of the top 5 national leagues in Europe (England, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) account collectively for 99 of the 600 current ECA members, and for 31 out of the total 137 ordinary members of ECA.
Governance of ECA: some key elements
The three pillars of ECA governance are the Board, the General Assembly and the Executive Committee. This analysis will focus on the Board and, in part, on the General Assembly, because their functioning is key in the context of the ECA-UEC debate (the Executive Committee was created by ECA in 2023 and is composed by a smaller group of Board members, with delegated authority from the Board to act as a more agile decision-making body; however, on certain matters only the Board can take decisions).
The Board has key powers in the decision-making mechanisms and management of the association: its 26 members must be from ordinary members of ECA, and from different Clubs. The term of office of Board members runs for one ECA cycle. Twelve of the 26 places are assigned to the Clubs of the member associations in the first six positions of the UEFA men’s association Club coefficient ranking – these Clubs are part of “Subdivision 1” of ECA. The Chair of ECA is elected by the Board among the 12 members of Subdivision 1. Twelve places are then assigned overall to Clubs of UEFA member associations which have a lower position in the ranking, with six, four and two places for Subdivisions 2, 3 and 4, respectively. The 24 ordinary members from the four Subdivisions have full voting rights. In addition, 2 members of the Board are elected as representatives of women’s Clubs, having voting rights only for decisions concerning exclusively a Women’s football matter, a matter regarding the developments of ECA as an organisation and any other matters specifically identified by the Board from time to time. Of the 26 Board members, 19 are elected by the General Assembly (including the two members representing women’s Clubs); 2 members of the Board are elected by the Board itself, among its members, as ECA representative at the UEFA Executive Committee; and, finally, 5 members of the Board are appointed by the Board itself, among its members, as ECA representatives at the Board of Administration of UEFA Club Competitions SA (UCC SA), a joint venture of UEFA and ECA dealing with business matters related to European Club competitions (e.g. marketing, commercial activities, finance, etc.).
Furthermore, up to additional 11 representatives/members may attend Board meetings as observers, without voting rights. Each of the four ECA Subdivisions elects, among its ordinary and associated members, one representative (for a total of four representatives) which may participate to Board meetings and discussions and have access to Board meeting documents, but may not vote. The Board may also appoint up to three independent members (of which at least one must be a woman) which – as the Subdivisions representatives – may also attend Board meetings and have access to documents, but without voting rights. Finally, in case a woman is not already present among the participants to the Board from a Subdivision and indicated as “Diversity Champion”, Board members from that Subdivision must appoint a female representative from a Club of that Subdvision, who will attend Board meetings as observer and will be the Diversity Champion of that Subdivision.
Overall, the total number of members/representatives in the Board may reach 37, with differences with regard to voting rights and functions. Out of the 37 members/representatives, 24 have full voting rights, 2 members (those representing women’s Clubs) have partial voting rights and 11 are observers without voting rights (members/representatives are currently 36, because at the moment there are only two independent members). In addition, the CEO of ECA, who is appointed by the Board, participates in the meetings of the Board without voting rights.
The Board has a wide range of powers and adopts its decisions by simple majority – except for three areas where a two-thirds majority is required. These areas are: i) the format of UEFA Club competitions; ii) the access list for any UEFA Club competition (which determines the entry stage in a competition for each qualified Club); and iii) the distribution of revenues related to any UEFA Club competition. It should be noted that the 12 Board members from Subdivision 1 may in principle not approve decisions alone (if all Board members with full voting rights participate to the meeting), neither by simple nor by qualified majority. However, they could have the necessary majority – both simple and two-thirds – if they vote together with the Board members from Subdivision 2. In addition, Board members of Subdivision 1 might be able to take decisions on their own in case of a reduced and not full participation of Board members with full voting rights (for example, if there are 23 voting members, the 12 members of Subdivision 1 would have the simple majority). Finally, in case of a tie the ECA Chair (which must come from Subdivision 1) has the casting vote.
The rights and tasks of ordinary members and associated members are detailed in the ECA statutes, in article 5 and article 7 respectively. Differently from ordinary members, the associated members, while having the possibility to attend the General Assembly as observers and having access to information and documents, do not have voting rights in the assembly with only one exception – voting for and being elected as Subdivision representative at the Board (without voting rights). Members of the ECA network have the opportunity to benefit from a range of services, but they don’t have voting rights and are not represented in the Board. Therefore, around 320 Clubs have the possibility to become part or attend the meetings of the ECA Board, but only ordinary members, as of today, have full voting rights in the Board (and in the General Assembly). This is the current framework, based on current ECA rules – but it is expected to change soon, as will be mentioned in more details below.
Some key matters in the ECA-UEC debate
ECA and UEC have different views on a number of issues, but it may be helpful to focus in particular on three areas: 1) Club representation and voting rights; 2) the economic and financial strength of big Clubs versus smaller Clubs, and the solidarity payments; 3) the criteria for the distribution of financial resources coming from UEFA Club competitions. These three topics do not constitute an exhaustive list of issues on which ECA and UEC may have different positions, but they can be considered particularly significant and representative, given that they touch upon critical points.
Club representation and voting rights
The issue of Club representation and voting rights is particularly controversial, especially from the UEC perspective – and this topic has been probably the most divisive so far. The granting of full voting rights, under current ECA rules, to ordinary members only – meaning, in practice, to top Clubs of first divisions, and with a higher weight for Clubs belonging to national associations which rank higher – has been one of the issues most criticized by the UEC. The UEC believes that the governance and functioning of ECA cause an excessive concentration of power in the hands of few big Clubs, without offering adequate representation to the other Clubs.
The UEC follows a model that is different from the current ECA model. Its goal is to offer representation to those European Clubs (almost 1,000 as of today) which are not part of ECA in any form, but also to those Clubs which are part of ECA but without the rights of the ordinary members (that is, associated members and network members, currently over 460 Club overall). In this context, the approach of the UEC is to ensure that each UEC member has full voting and participation rights, on the basis of the “one Club one vote” principle. There is no distinction between Clubs, there are no different types of membership and all members have the possibility to be part of all UEC bodies, including the Executive Board. The number of over 130 members of UEC is much lower than the number of 600 ECA members, but when only members with full voting rights are considered, the two associations currently have a comparable number of members.
The ECA has a different position on this matter. The ECA does not consider itself at all as the association of big Clubs. The Chair of ECA, Nasser Al-Khelaïfi, has repeatedly emphasised that ECA is a dynamic, democratic, representative and inclusive organisation, giving voice to the many and not to the few, with the objective of promoting the interests of the entire football pyramid, not just of “élite Clubs”. In its public communication, the ECA tends to stress the significant development in its membership, especially in the last year, and the spectrum of opportunities and services offered by ECA to all its members, including associated and network members. Furthermore – and this is a key point – ECA rules are substantially based on the idea that members with more direct interest in the European competitions should have a stronger representation and a higher weight in decision-making mechanisms – because these Clubs are those which regularly participate to European competitions. From this perspective, the various types of membership may be, in the view of ECA, more effective in promoting the interests of these Clubs and at the same time offering benefits also to associated and network members, while taking into account their different (less frequent or absent) involvement in European competitions.
However, the picture presented so far with regard to the different types of ECA membership, representation and voting rights could change soon. In recent years the ECA has embarked on a process of internal reforms. A first outcome was the changes to the ECA statutes in 2023 which included, among other elements, granting access to the Board for associated members, independent members, members representing women’s Clubs and female representatives for the Subdivisions (“Diversity Champions”). However, the reform process is not over. The ECA is planning an evolution in the structure of its membership which will lead to a transformation of the current model: the three-tiered approach will be replaced by a more comprehensive and inclusive model called “Membership for All”. Such new model should allow all Clubs, irrespective of their size or turnover, to be ECA members and participate to the decision-making process. In addition, the new model should allow Clubs which are currently network members to have representation and voice in the Board. This reform process, aimed to bolstering democracy, participation and inclusion in the association, will require further amendments to the ECA statutes, which are expected to be submitted for approval to the General Assembly later in 2024.
Clearly, the details of this ECA reform will be crucial to assess its impact and implications. In particular,a possible adoption of the “one Club one vote” principle, as well as potential changes to the mechanisms regulating access to decision-taking bodies, might change the dynamics of the ECA-UEC debate on the issue of representation.
The balance of financial forces and the solidarity payments
A second crucial issue is the distribution of resources: in this area, the UEC intends to remedy the economic and financial imbalances that currently, according to the UEC, harm the medium and small Clubs relative to the big Clubs. The current gap between big Clubs and the other Clubs is considered by the UEC, to a large extent although not exclusively, as a by-product of mechanisms of distribution of UEFA resources: these would result in a disproportionate advantage for big Clubs and would also end up causing competitive distortions in national leagues. In addition, competitive distortions can also originate in the case of medium or small Clubs participating in domestic competitions with relative limited economic size, if these Clubs receive through UEFA resources a benefit which is very large relative to their financial strength. Such benefit may create a gap vis-à-vis the other Clubs participating to the same domestic league, in practice causing competitive distortions that can be hardly filled by other Clubs. Competitive distortions on national leagues are a very relevant topic for the UEC, which has among its objectives ensuring the strength of both national and European competitions – therefore avoiding that European tournaments may result in harms for national leagues.
The marked difference in the aggregated economic power between Clubs which are members of ECA and those which are members of UEC can certainly help to better understand the different views of ECA and UEC on this topic. The economic and financial weight of ECA members is much stronger than that of UEC members, because big Clubs are members of ECA – and these Clubs typically have turnovers in the order of several hundred million euros. Considering those Clubs which are present in the interim Executive Board of UEC, none of them has a figure of total revenues reaching € 100 mln: the Club with the highest turnover, based on the latest available figures, is Osasuna, with around € 71 mln, followed by Union Saint-Gilloise with around € 41 mln. Total revenues of the other Clubs represented in the interim Executive Board of UEC is generally lower than € 10 mln. Obviously, a fully representative comparison can be developed once the full list of UEC members is made publicly available, but it is already clear that the economic and financial strength is different and that, as a consequence, the interests and incentives in terms of distribution of resources are structurally different.
A line of reasoning that speaks for the big Clubs which regularly participate to the European Club competitions, and especially to the Champions League, is that these Clubs are those which generate the financial resources which are then distributed by UEFA. From the point of view of these Clubs, it is therefore appropriate that the generated resources are redistributed largely to this group of Clubs, while still leaving a share to the other Clubs – the so called “solidarity payments”. Solidarity payments are distributed by UEFA to the Clubs which have not participated to the European cups – or have not participated to the group stage of these competitions, having been eliminated in previous knock-out rounds.
In this regard, it is important to recall that in 2023 UEFA decided to increase the share of solidarity payments for the next cycle of its Club competitions (2024-2027), raising it from 7% to 10% of estimated revenues. Of this 10%, 7% (€ 308 mln, based on estimates) will be distributed to Clubs that have not participated to UEFA competitions – not even to the preliminary rounds – instead of 4% (out of a total of 7%) in the previous cycle; 3% (€ 132 mln, based on estimates) will continue to be allocated to Clubs which were eliminated in the preliminary rounds. The increase in the percentage of distribution – both overall and for non-participant Clubs – together with the expected higher revenues from UEFA Club competitions, also thanks to the new formats starting in the 2024/2025 season – is estimated to produce an increase in solidarity payments of approximately 70% in 2024/2025 relative to 2023/2024 (from € 274 mln to € 465 mln also including € 22 mln for the Women Champions League and € 3 mln for the Youth League). The increase of solidarity payments had been advocated and then received broad support from multiple relevant stakeholders – not only ECA and UEC but also European Leagues, the association of leagues in Europe.
Everything settled, then? The answer is negative, given the different incentives of ECA and UEC which have been mentioned above and are due to the different financial strength of the Clubs they represent. The ECA welcomed as an extremely positive step the increase in solidarity payments, which was presented as an integral component of the agreement between UEFA and ECA when their Memorandum of Understanding was renewed. In its press release, the ECA noted that such increase is unprecedented and will bring benefits to Clubs in domestic league competitions, and that this mechanism is the sole redistribution scheme for Clubs at a pan-European level. The UEC, which advocates for the principle of solidarity as a crucial element for a balanced development of football, also welcomed this step. However, the UEC regards this improvement in solidarity payments as a necessary but not sufficient measure to structurally solve the problem of economic and financial imbalances between Clubs, of which the distribution of UEFA resources represents just one (certainly important) factor. The logic of the UEC is, essentially, that big Club could not be big Clubs unless they could compete with smaller Clubs, and that this fact is in their view not reflected in the current framework, which does not ensure the necessary economic and financial balance between the big Clubs and the other Clubs. On the contrary, according to the UEC there is a risk of a further progressive widening of the gap – a trend which is not in line with a key goal of the UEC, the promotion of competitive balance.
The criteria for the distribution of UEFA Club competition revenues
The criteria for the allocation of UEFA resources to the Clubs participating to European cups are another complex and controversial issue, on which ECA and UEC have in practice different preferences. The UEC believes that the mechanisms for distribution of UEFA revenues which have been in place until today have disproportionately favored those Clubs with a stronger and more successful football history and with stronger TV markets. This is due, according to the UEC, to the inclusion in the criteria of these factors (coefficient and market pool) with a disproportionate weight, at the expense of sporting merit, which is only one of the various components in the methodology. The UEC argued, also in an event organised in Brussels in October 2023, that the criteria used so far have paved the way for a progressive increase of concentration of financial resources distributed to the biggest European Clubs. As mentioned, the UEC considers the distribution of UEFA resources only one – but important – driver behind the increasing financial gap between big Clubs and the others: however, this factor might in turn cause further distortions on other variables of interest, as it might contribute to an excessive polarization of the other revenues (e.g. commercial, sponsorships, etc.). All these effects may cumulate over time, creating a gap which in practice may be impossible to fill.
Recent decisions by UEFA seem to have taken these arguments into account, at least in part. For the next cycle, 2024-2027, for Champions League and Europa League the weight of the equal shares pillar in the distribution of revenues will increase from 25% to 27.5%, while the weight of the performance/sporting component will increase from 30% al 37.5%. A new value indicator (Value Pillar) will substitute the coefficient and the market pool indicator, with a weight of 35%, which is lower than the aggregate 45% currently assigned to the coefficient and market pool criteria (for the Conference League the weights would overall not change, with 40% for equal shares, 40% for performance, and 20% for value). The ECA expressed satisfaction for the adoption of the new methodology, which it had also advocated and that, as the increase in solidarity payments, was part of the agreement with UEFA upon the renewal of the Memorandum of Understanding. On the one hand, this step goes also in the direction desired by the UEC, but on the other hand the new criteria are probably still far from what the UEC would consider an ideal solution: the UEC would probably aim for further and more significant reductions in the weights of the value pillar in favor of the performance/sporting merit component – again with the purpose of reducing the economic and financial imbalances between big Clubs and medium and smaller Clubs.
The “fight” for members
The strong divergences between ECA and UEC resulted also in an intense “fight” to attract members. On one side, the UEC has been successful in recruiting a relevant number of members, in a relatively short time horizon and despite not having been recognized formally as stakeholder by UEFA. On the other side, the recent and extremely fast increase in the number of members of ECA – especially of network members – had led to a massive enlargement of the ECA family. The clash between ECA and UEC became apparent also due to the prohibition for ECA members to join the UEC, with exclusion from ECA as sanction, on the basis of its rules (such case has concerned Union Saint-Gilloise): article 8 of the ECA statutes prohibits the participation of ECA members to another association or organization grouping Clubs from more than one UEFA national association (unless such association is recognized by ECA together with FIFA and/or the respective confederation).
A crucial question is whether more associations representing the Clubs and protecting their interests at the European level could or should co-exist – or whether, instead, it is preferrable to have only one association. The ECA believes that Club representation should be in the hands of one association only: the argument is that having more bodies aiming to promoting the interests of Clubs with the relevant counterparties could end up weakening the Clubs, as they would not be able to speak with one, single voice. In this regard, it may be helpful to recall that the Memorandum of Understanding between ECA e UEFA, renewed in September 2023 and with a duration until July 2030, indicates the ECA as the sole body representative of Clubs at the European level (the same recognition is part of the agreement on the Memorandum of Understanding between ECA and FIFA). The UEC, which aims to also obtain formal recognition by UEFA, has a different position, which is driven by the different nature of Clubs: in practice, the UEC is targeting especially medium and small Clubs, regarding the ECA as an association representing big Clubs. Therefore, from the UEC perspective, having two co-existing associations would not be harmful but, on the contrary, it would be necessary and useful: this would not weaken the position of Clubs and would rather strengthen them, because each of the two associations would be able to better promote the interests of its members taking into account their different specificities.
A look into the future
It remains to be seen how the “fight” for members will end. In a phase of strong expansion for the ECA, it is to be seen whether the UEC will be able to have a similar power of attracting new Clubs, and whether there will be other cases of ECA members willing to risk their position in the ECA in order to be able to join the UEC project. Beyond the purely numerical aspect, it will also be interesting to compare the geographical composition of the membership of the two associations (once the list of UEC members is made public).
The Super League offered to ECA and UEC the opportunity to have a substantially similar position on one major topic, given that both are opposed to this project. Future developments will tell whether the interests of the two associations – and of their members – might converge, partially or entirely, on any other major European or global issue.
Last, but certainly not least in terms of importance, the details of the upcoming ECA internal reform, notably on representation and voting rights of Clubs, will be crucial to assess whether, or to what extent, the current differences between ECA and UEC on these matters will persist.